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Abstract 
In the new millennium‟s second decade, tribunals around the world work to foster justice for the 
victims of major civil and human rights abuses.  In doing so, they also seek to repair continuing 
damage to the social fabric of affected polities.  That so many special tribunals—prosecutorial 
and reconciliatory—are now grappling with historic injustices is salutary.  Long-suffering groups 
are starting to find their voices; global communities are beginning to listen.  And human rights 
organizations are writing rights to redress into their operating documents.  According to 
observers, the communities of humankind are engaging an “Age of Reconciliation.”  Yet, the 
paths to social healing are rubble strewn.  Redress initiatives for even fully acknowledged 
injustices face stiff opposition.  Disagreements over culpability and reparative responsibility 
quickly arise.  Even sympathetic governments plead financial incapacity.  And traditional legal 
remedies are slow in coming and limited in reach.  Moreover, the formal legal process falls far 
short of addressing the damage to culture, communities, education and economic and spiritual 
well-being—damage that persists over generations. 
 
This essay employs a multidisciplinary “human capability” approach to extend 
jurisprudential concepts in order to rethink a key aspect of reparatory justice.  It addresses, 
during economic retrenchment, the salience of a country‟s promise of economic justice as a key 
aspect of its larger commitment to reconciliation, or social healing, for the persisting wounds of 
historic wrongs—wounds inflicted through systemic discrimination, denials of self-
determination, violence or culture suppression.  Through an examination of Peru‟s and South 
Africa‟s complex reconciliation initiatives, it engages the questions:  What does economic justice 
as future capacity-building, as an integral part of a social healing initiative, look like practically 
on the ground—where things quickly get messy?  And what happens to the mix of individual 
reparations and economic development when a government is threatened by financial instability?  
More particularly, what happens to bottom-up plans for economic justice when government and 
business fail to fund promised individual reparations?  When plans for economic restructuring 
stall?  When government cries of “no money” present real political obstacles to even well-
conceived reconciliation plans?  The essay concludes that in addition to public story-telling and 
allocation of responsibility, capacity-building for those most harmed through individual 
payments and economic restructuring and development—economic justice—may well be a key 
to a public sense of "reconciliation achieved". 
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REDRESS AND THE SALIENCE OF ECONOMIC JUSTICE 
 
In the new millennium‟s second decade, tribunals around the world work to foster justice for the 
victims of major civil and human rights abuses.  In doing so, they also seek to repair the 
continuing damage to the social fabric of affected polities.
1
  From the World War II Holocaust in 
Europe and internment of Japanese Americans in the United States to South African Apartheid 
and Cambodian Genocide, the twentieth century witnessed the broad-scale denigration and 
exclusion of outsider ethnic and cultural groups.
2
  This systemically-rooted oppression not only 
badly harmed the people denigrated and excluded.  It also marked mainstream societies with 
divisions, mistrust, ill-will and guilt.  And even when direct abuse largely ended, its aftermath 
remained in bodily scars, damaged psyches, economic distress and broken social structures. 
 That so many special tribunals—prosecutorial and reconciliatory—are now grappling 
with historic injustices is salutary.  Long-suffering groups are starting to find their voices; global 
communities are beginning to listen.  And human rights organizations are writing rights to 
redress into their operating documents.
3
  According to observers, the communities of humankind 
are engaging an “Age of Reconciliation.”
4
 
Yet, the paths to social healing are rubble strewn.
5
  Redress initiatives for even fully 
acknowledged injustices face stiff opposition.  Disagreements over culpability and reparative 
responsibility quickly arise.  Even sympathetic governments plead financial incapacity.  And 
traditional legal remedies are slow in coming and limited in reach.  Courts can award individual 
compensation for actual damages and order property restitution, but only after lengthy and costly 
litigation.  Moreover, the formal legal process falls far short of addressing the damage to culture, 




                                                 
1
 See generally THE POLITICS OF RECONCILIATION IN MULTICULTURAL SOCIETIES (Will Kymlicka & Bashir Bashir, 
eds., 2008). 
2
 See generally THE HANDBOOK OF REPARATIONS (Pablo de Greiff, ed., 2006). 
3
 See The Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations 
of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law, G.A. Res. 60/147, 
U.N. Doc.A/RES/60/147 (March 21, 2006). 
4
 Eric K. Yamamoto & Ashley Obrey, Reframing Redress:  A “Social Healing Through Justice” Approach to Native 
Hawaiian-United States and Indigenous Ainu-Japan Reconciliation Initiatives, 16 ASIAN AM. L.J. 5, 32 (2009) 
[hereinafter Yamamoto & Obrey, Reframing Redress]. 
5
 See, e.g., The Extraordinary Chambers of the Courts of Cambodia [ECCC], July 26, 2010, “KAING Guek Eav 
alias Duch, Judgment” (Cam.), which recognized “the principles expressing the right of victims of gross violations 
of international human rights law to redress. . . .”  (Id. at par. 662) (citing Articles 2(3), 9(5) and 14(6) of the 
ICCPR; Article 14 of the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, 1465 UNTS 85, Dec. 10,  1984; Article 75 of the ICC Statute; Article 24 of the United Nations 
Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, GA Res. 61.177, Dec. 20, 2006, 
A/RES/61/177, not yet in force ), but cautioned that without more power “the Chamber can merely encourage 
national authorities, the international community and other potential donors to show solidarity with the victims by 
providing financial and other forms of support that contributes to their rehabilitation, reintegration, and restoration 
of dignity.”  Id. at par. 663. 
6
Thomas Antkowiak argues that the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has done a far better job than other 
courts, especially the European Court of Human Rights, of implementing a range of reparations.  See Thomas 
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This essay employs a multidisciplinary approach to extend jurisprudential concepts in 
order to rethink a key aspect of reparatory justice—the role of economic justice for redress 
initiatives aimed at reconciliation.  In the past, American scholars have tended to split economic 
analysis (testing propositions fueled by quantitative analyses and predictive models) from 
democracy studies (exploring political institutions and citizenry through moral philosophy and, 
lately, critical theory).
7
  Legal scholars have been similarly divided.  Recently, however, some in 
the field of law and economics have started to examine the once cast-in-stone assumption that 
people act privately as perfect rational wealth maximizers and that this individualistic action, if 
government stays out of the way, ultimately benefits all of society.
8
  They have begun to look 
closely at questions of fair distribution and community impact.
9
  At the same time, some 
democracy theorists have begun to engage what economic analysis can tell us about justice in 
light of institutional and group reactions to market incentives and government initiatives. 
This essay emerges at this intersection.  It has two parts:  conceptual and illustrative.  It 
addresses, during economic retrenchment, the salience of a country‟s promise of economic 
justice as a key aspect of its larger commitment to reconciliation, or social healing, for the 
persisting wounds of historic wrongs—wounds inflicted through systemic discrimination, denials 
of self-determination, violence or culture suppression.  Professor Yamamoto‟s earlier article 
addressed “Social Healing Through Justice”—an approach to guiding and critiquing 
reconciliation initiatives that draws upon commonalities from social psychology, theology, 
political theory, economics, indigenous healing practices and law (including human rights).
10
  
These commonalities inform a redress framework marked by four Rs:  recognition (personal 
storytelling, historical excavation; assessments of power misuse); responsibility (for acts of 
wrongdoing and for receipt of benefits); reconstruction; and reparation.
11
   
                                                                                                                                                             
Antkowiak, A 21
st
 Century Mandate for International Tribunals: Victim-Centered Remedies and Restorative Justice 
10-11 (2010) (on file with author) (“[T]he Inter-American Court. . . regularly orders measures of restitution, 
rehabilitation, satisfaction and guarantees of non-repetition, in conjunction with compensation. . . .  [in contrast], the 
European Court of Human Rights has historically favored granting only monetary compensation and declarative 
relief.”) [hereinafter Antkowiak, A 21
st
 Century Mandate].  See also Thomas Antkowiak, Remedy Approaches to 
Human Rights Violations: The Inter-American Court of Human Rights and Beyond 46 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT‟L L. 
351, 357 (2008). 
7
 EMMA COLEMAN JORDAN & ANGELA P. HARRIS, ECONOMIC JUSTICE: RACE, GENDER, IDENTITY AND ECONOMICS 
(2005) [hereinafter JORDAN & HARRIS]. 
8
 Koushik Ghosh, Culture, Government and Markets, 2 FORUM ON PUBLIC POLICY ONLINE 1, 8 (2009) notes that the 
recent financial “crisis has opened up new admissions and an opportunity for considering well established critiques 
of neoclassical economics within the mainstream.” 
9
 See JORDAN & HARRIS, supra note 7. 
10
 ERIC K. YAMAMOTO, INTERRACIAL JUSTICE: CONFLICT AND RECONCILIATION IN POST CIVIL RIGHTS AMERICA 
(2000). 
11
 Eric K. Yamamoto & Ashley Obrey, Reframing Redress, supra note 4, at 32 
Four commonalities emerge from diverse disciplines about the dynamics of the kind of justice that fosters 
social healing.  The first is the embrace of the [position that] allare members of the polity, and injury to one 
harms the entire community; therefore healing the injured is the responsibility of all.  The second is that 
repair must occur in two realms simultaneously--the individual (micro) and the institutional (macro).  
Participation in the process must be widespread, and all must see a benefit. The third commonality is that 
there must be material change in the socioeconomic conditions underlying reconstructed group 
relationships --otherwise, the dangers of “empty apologies,” “all words and no action,” “false grace,” or a 
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This essay does not delve further into the framework.  Rather it focuses on the latter two 
Rs, reconstruction and reparation, in light of the significance of government‟s (and business‟) 
failure to take continuing affirmative steps toward economic justice as a part of their social 
healing commitment.  One reason for our exploration is the political (and legal) relegation of 
“economic rights” to a lower rung on a human rights hierarchy—below "civil and political 
rights"
12
—and for economic justice to therefore receive short shrift politically in the 
implementation of reconciliation initiatives during tough financial times.
13
   
To start, the economic dimension to social healing embraces reparations for harmed 
individuals to partially compensate for material and psychological damage.
14
  But it cuts far 
deeper.  It also addresses the structural conditions that determine those individuals‟ life 
opportunities—education, job skills training, access to capital—and addresses the damage to the 
polity itself (the resulting social divisions, ill will, dampened productivity and diminished 
legitimacy).
15
  What are the theoretical foundations for this perspective? 
 Amartya Sen‟s “Human Capability Approach,”
 16
 criticized by some,
17
 and refined by 
Martha Nussbaum
18
 and others, offers insights into the kinds of integrated individual reparations 
and broader economic development that shape the envisioned economic justice at the heart of 
many reconciliation initiatives.  The capability approach avoids focus on aggregate economic 
indicators because an emphasis on gross wealth maximization tends to ignore the concerns of 
                                                                                                                                                             
“failure of reconciliation.”  The fourth commonality among the disciplines distills the other commonalities 
into the “Four R's” of Social Healing Through Justice: recognition, responsibility, reconstruction, and 
reparation. 
12
 See, e.g., Maurice Cranston, Human Rights, Real and Supposed, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF HUMAN RIGHTS 163, 164 
(Patrick Hayden ed., 2001).  Cranston observes that a "philosophically respectable concept of human rights has been 
muddled. . . .  The traditional human rights are political and civil rights. . . .  What are now being put forward as 
universal human rights are social and economic rights. . . .  [T]he new theory does not makes sense. . . .  [T]he 
circulation of a confused notion of human rights hinders the effective protection of what are correctly seen as human 
rights.”  See also Makau wa Mutua, The Ideology of Human Rights, 36 VA. J. INT‟L L. 589, 604-05 (1995-1996) 
(“Sometimes writers and actors in human rights refer to „generations‟ of rights, a euphemism that variously 
describes ranking, acceptability, or even the order in which rights “ought” to be implemented or realized [and thus] 
civil and political rights are regarded as „first generation‟ rights while economic, social, and cultural rights are 
termed „second generation‟ rights.”). 
13
 See discussion infra on Peru and South Africa. 
14
 See PRISCILLA B. HAYNER, UNSPEAKABLE TRUTHS 165 (2010) (“The classic notion of reparations today is focused 
on direct benefits, usually through specific financial support (or direct services) to individuals.”). 
15
 See A GRAND DESIGN FOR PEACE AND RECONCILIATION (Yoichiro Murakami and Thomas J. Schoenbaum, eds., 
2008). 
16
 AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 6 (1999). 
17
 See S. Charusheela, Social Analysis and the Capabilities Approach: A Limit to Martha Nussbaum’s Universalist 
Ethics, 33 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 1135 (2009) (arguing that Nussbaum‟s claims to universalism betrays a western 
bias); Lourdes Beneria, The Crisis of Care, Globalization of Reproduction, and „Reconciliation‟ Policies , 8th 
International GEM-IWG Conference: Engendering Macroeconomics and International Economics (July 21, 2007) 
available at http://www.econ.utah.edu/genmac/DOC/2007/2007papers/beneriapap.pdf (arguing that Nussbaum‟s 
approach is useful “but still to general to specify” policies”). 
18
 See Martha C. Nussbaum, Human Rights and Human Capabilities, 20 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 21, 21 (2007) (“The 
most important theoretical development in human rights during the past two decades has been the elaboration of the 
„Human Development Approach‟...embodied in the Human Development Reports of the United Nations 
Development Programme annually since 1990, and in theoretical work by Amartya Sen, myself, and, by now, 
hundreds of young scholars in various nations.”) [hereinafter Nussbaum, Human Rights and Human Capabilities]. 
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society‟s most vulnerable segments.
19
  Instead, the approach focuses on qualitative aspects of life 
that are linked to economic development and repair for those damaged by the injustice:
20
  decent 
work opportunities, health care, education, infant and foster care, political liberties, freedom 
from violence, ethnic and gender equality.
21
   
The approach thus assesses economic activity by looking at impacts on “people one by 
one" and insists on first locating the purpose of "economic empowerment” in individuals‟ 
freedoms, rather than a nation‟s wealth.
22
  In doing so, the approach stresses the interrelatedness 
of individual freedoms and economic capacity and security, and it identifies a significant though 
limited role for government in altering underlying socio-economic arrangements.
23
 
In the context of a reconciliation initiative, the capability approach also points 
reconstruction and reparation toward participation by those at the bottom in shaping redress 
through mapping the fuller range of harms, corresponding responsibilities and possibilities for 
repair.  In Development As Freedom, Sen measures the justice of a given institutional 
arrangement by focusing on whether the least empowered are still able to actualize their potential 
in ways that they find satisfying.
24
  Nussbaum draws on Aristotelian theory to conclude that “a 
good political arrangement is one „in accordance with which anyone whatsoever might do well 
and live a flourishing life.‟”
25
   
Carlton Waterhouse underscores the importance of reframing redress away from the 
perpetrators and around the capacity-building needs and desires of those harmed.  
[M]ost reparations schemes routinely emphasize the actions of past violators to 
define and evaluate reparations, thereby maintaining the continued subordination 
of victims and the primary importance of violators.  This approach can provide 
past violators with an almost unilateral ability to decide, if, when, and how to 
                                                 
19
 See Martha C. Nussbaum, Human Capabilities, Female Human Beings in WOMEN, CULTURE, AND 
DEVELOPMENT: A STUDY OF HUMAN CAPABILITIES 61, 62 (Martha C. Nussbaum & Jonathon Glover eds., 1996) 
[hereinafter Nussbaum, Human Capabilities, Female Human Beings]. 
20
 See Martha C. Nussbaum, Capabilities and Human Rights, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 273, 280 (1997) (“In short, the 
crude approach [of considering aggregate economic wealth] does not even tell us who has the money, and thus 
typically gave high marks to nations such as South Africa, which contained enormous inequalities.”) [hereinafter 
Nussbaum, Capabilities and Human Rights]. 
21
 Nussbaum identifies ten central human capacities that individuals need to fully develop in Nussbaum, Human 
Rights and Human Capabilities, supra note 18, at 23-24, listing life; health; bodily integrity; senses, imagination, 
and thought; emotions; practical reason; affiliation; interacting with the environment and other species; play; and 
political and material control over one‟s environment. 
22
 Nussbaum, Capabilities and Human Rights, supra note 20, at 285. 
23
 See Sen, supra note 16, at 120.  According to Sen, "the freedom-efficiency of the market mechanism, on the one 
hand, and the seriousness of freedom-inequality problems, on the other hand, are worth considering simultaneously.  
The equity problems have to be addressed, especially in dealing with serious deprivations and poverty, and in that 
context social intervention including governmental support may well have an important role.” 
24
 Antkowiak calls for similar action at the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.  
Following a finding of liability and general objectives set out by the Court, the parties and relevant experts 
would discuss and devise remedies, with the facilitation of a mediator.  The resulting agreement, to be 
approved by the Court, would lend more legitimacy to the reparations judgment, since the remedies would 
be ultimately formulated not by distant international judges (albeit with significant victim input), but rather 
by the stakeholders and experts after substantial deliberation. 
Antkowiak, A 21
st
 Century Mandate, supra note 6, at 37. 
25
 Nussbaum, Human Capabilities, Female Human Beings, supra note 19, at 81 (citing ARISTOTLE, POLITICS VII:I). 
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make reparations, with little regard to the victims' views or role in the design and 




Legal scholars have begun to emphasize this perspective in evaluating the economic dimensions 
to the anticipated and on-going work of human rights tribunals.
27
   Priscilla Hayner notes that, 
“[r]ecovery may depend in part on [kind of economic] reparations awarded, and many 
commissions have played an important role in recommending [broad] reparations programs.”
28
 
 Waterhouse and others do not diminish the role of monetary compensation in a larger 
reparative scheme.  He emphasizes, however, that public coffer payments to individuals alone do 
not embody a sufficient societal commitment to reparatory justice or social healing.
29
  Economic 
justice entails something more.  For psychologist Judith Herman, victims/survivors value 
monetary payments most when those payments reflect a "sense that the people who did the 
damage are made to give something back, or to try to clean up the mess that they made.”
30
 
 For this reason, according to Thomas Antkowiak, the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights contemplates individual monetary payments as part of a package of reparative options 
that aim to address the diverse needs of victims of systemic abuses.  The "Inter-American Court. 
. . regularly orders measures of restitution, rehabilitation, satisfaction and guarantees of non-
repetition, in conjunction with compensation.”
31
  This contrasts with “the European Court of 
Human Rights [that] has historically favored granting only monetary compensation and 
declarative relief.”
32
  Consistent with the capability approach, Antkowiak suggests that after a 
tribunal finds human rights violations it should shepherd through an arbitrated remedial phase 
that empowers victims to negotiate with government and perpetrators to shape meaningful 
repairs—reparatory measures that bolster former victims‟ capabilities and often include both 
direct individual payments and broader community economic development.  In that way, “[t]he 
resulting agreement, to be approved by the Court, would lend more legitimacy to the reparations 
judgment, since the remedies would be ultimately formulated not by distant international judges 




 With these theoretical insights as backdrop, the questions emerge:  what does economic 
justice as future capacity-building, as an integral part of a social healing initiative, look like 
practically on the ground—where things quickly get messy?  And what happens to the mix of 
individual reparations and economic development when a government is threatened by financial 
instability?  In other words, what happens to bottom-up plans for economic justice when 
                                                 
26
 Carlton Waterhouse, The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: Moral Agency and the Role of Victims in Reparations 
Programs, 31 U. PA. J. INT‟L L. 257, 267 (2009). 
27
 HAYNER, supra note 14, at 166 (“beginning in 2008 a number of publications have begun to explore the link 
between economic development and transitional justice”). 
28
 Id.  at 157. 
29
 Id. at 261. 
30




 Century Mandate, supra note 6, at 10. 
32
 Id. at 11. 
33
 Id. at 37. 
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government and business fail to fund promised individual reparations?  When plans for 
economic restructuring stall?  When government cries of “no money” present real political 
obstacles to even well-conceived reconciliation plans?   
Indeed, in times of economic distress, the promise of reparatory payments to individuals 
suffering financially and emotionally (including monetary lump sums, scholarships for children, 
extended medical treatment fees, capital for rebuilding destroyed businesses) are often quickly 
forsaken.
34
  And the reconstruction of key business and government practices that undergirded 
the injustice—both to right the wrong and to focus reparatory measures on future 
opportunities—tends to fall by the wayside.   
One lesson to draw from these realities, which is teased out in the following concrete 
examples, is that despite a formal tribunal with extensive victim storytelling, perpetrator 
confessions of responsibility and investigations into causes, the failure to make promised 
individual payments and to restructure business and government to generate present economic 
benefits and future opportunities for those most harmed leads to perceptions of failed 
reconciliation—“just talk” and little action.
35
  Those who say they commit to reconciliation but 
abandon the promise of economic justice because of “other priorities” are in effect renouncing 
the goal of social healing as a foundation for moving collectively forward. 
Peru and South Africa provide apt, broadly drawn, illustrations.
36
   Both countries 
adopted redress initiatives that embraced a capacity-building approach, viewing personal dignity, 
educational opportunity, political activity and economic justice as elements of the reconciliation 
edifice. 
In the 1980s and 90s Maoist rebels in Peru and then-President Alberto Fujimori‟s 
government clashed violently.  Widespread human rights violations on all sides marked the 
conflict.
37
  In 2001, an interim government established a Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
                                                 
34
 HAYNER, supra note 14, at 163 (“in more cases, the government has responded slowly or with tepid interest, and if 
a program is developed it is more limited in size and reach than envisioned by the commission”). 
35
 YAMAMOTO, INTERRACIAL JUSTICE, supra note 10, at 175. 
36
 These illustrations are broadly drawn, without attention to nuance or other perspectives because of the brevity of 
the essay format. 
37
 Lisa J. Laplante, On the Indivisibility of Rights: Truth Commissions, Reparations, and the Right to Development, 
10 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 141, 143 (2007) [hereinafter Laplante, On the Indivisibility of Human Rights] (“in 
1980 the self-declared Maoist group Sendero Luminoso…declared war on the state to make way for its own utopian 
visions. SL soon resorted to viciously violent tactics that provoked equally violent reactions from the armed forces 
and led to the death and disappearance of thousands of Peruvians, mostly in the rural, poor countryside”) (citing 
GUSTAVO GORRITI, THE SHINING PATH (1999)). 
Initially, Shining Path sparked its violent campaign against the state in the remote rural highlands of the 
country, beginning what quickly degenerated into a vicious reign of terror.  At first, the governmental 
response included a brutal counter-insurgency war led by the military, which often confused „Andean 
peasants‟ with „terrorists,‟ resulting in indiscriminate killings of this population. . . . [A]pproximately 
69,280 people had been killed during the war. . . .  [T]he TRC held the Sendero Luminoso responsible for 
fifty-four percent of the deaths reported to the RTC and the armed forces for thirty-six percent.”)  
Lisa J. Laplante, The Law of Remedies and the Clean Hands Doctrine: Exclusionary Reparation Policies in Peru’s 
Political Transition, 23 AM. U. INT‟L L. REV. 51, 69-70 (2007), citing Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Peru), 
Final Report, available at http://www.cverdad.org.pe/ingles/ifinal/conclusiones.php [hereinafter TRC Final Report]; 
Press Release, TRC Final Report Was Made Public on August 28th at Noon (August 2003), available at http:// 
www.cverdad.org.pe/ingles/informacion/nprensa/notas.php?idnota=171., at par. 13. 
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that conducted 40 workshops “to involve victim-survivors in determining their needs and 
presenting” reparations demands.
38
  The Commission‟s resulting Plan Integral de Reparaciones 
(“Integral Reparations Plan”) [PIR] was among “the most comprehensive reparations 
plans…from a truth commission process” anywhere.
39
 
The PIR not only investigated specific wrongful acts and resulting harms, it also 
examined deeper socio-economic causes.  Its recommendations embraced individual capacity-
building by targeting both individual payments for those directly injured and institutional 
restructuring to begin to get at the poverty roots of the conflict, including economic initiatives 
(starting in the poorest regions) to generate an infrastructure for education, health and jobs.
 40
  
Hayner describes the plan as “perhaps the most widely consulted and deeply considered of all 
reparations programs around the world to date.”
41
  The reparations plan targeted the injuries 
sustained by direct victims (those “displaced, forcefully imprisoned, recruited by terrorist groups, 
tortured, raped”)
42
 but also focused on indirect victims of community violence (small businesses, 
students, elders).  The plan aimed to help heal the self-identified wounds of the many while 
beginning to transform society itself. 
In attempting to implement the recommendations of the Commission, however, the 
Peruvian government stumbled through a series of measures that have been viewed by many as 
inadequate and misdirected.  In 2003, President Alejandro Toledo proposed a Plan de Desarrollo 
y Paz (Plan of Development and Peace) that provided educational benefits to the children of 
those most affected by the civil war.
43
  In 2005, the Peruvian Congress passed a law that 
essentially incorporated all of the recommendations of the PIR, except for the provisions calling 
for individual economic reparations.
44
  In the same year, an executive decree directed regional 
governments to use portions of their normal operating budget to implement aspects of the PIR.
45
  
In 2007, the Peruvian government committed new money to the PIR, establishing a 45 million 
Peruvian Soles fund ($14.2 million) for education, health and economic production projects 
associated with the PIR.
 46
  The development projects, however, required victims to compete 
                                                 
38
 Laplante, On the Indivisibility of Human Rights, supra note 37, at 159. 
39
 Id. at 160. 
40
 Laplante, On the Indivisibility of Human Rights, supra note 37, at 160. 
[The PIR‟s] components include symbolic reparations, attention to physical and mental health, educational 
opportunities, restitution and rehabilitation of citizen rights, collective reparations and individual economic 
reparations.  Beneficiaries of these measures include both direct and indirect victims, such as families of 
the disappeared and extra-judicially killed. Direct victims include those who were displaced, forcefully 
and/or unjustly imprisoned, recruited by terrorist groups, tortured, raped and otherwise injured.   
Id. (citing Comision de la Verdad y Reconciliacion, Informe Final 2003, Vol. IX, Part 4, Ch. 2.2, available at 
http://www.cverdad.org.pe/ifinal/index.php). 
41
 Hayner, supra note 14, at 173. 
42
 Laplante, supra note 37, at 160 (citing TRC Final Report, vol. 4, Ch. 2.2). 
43
 Id. at 162 (citing Mensaje Del Presidente Alejandro Toledo Sobre El Informe De La Comisión De La Verdad Y 
La Reconciliación (November 22, 2003), available at http:// www.justiciaviva.org.pe/otros/mensajepresidente.doc 
(last visited Feb. 22, 2007)).  
44
 Id. (citing Law No. 28592 (Jul. 29, 2005), available at http:// www.idl.org.pe/educa/PIR/28592.pdf.). 
45
 Id.  (citing Decreto Supremo N° 047-2005-PCM (July 7, 2005), available at 
http://www.idl.org.pe/educa/PIR/047.pdf.). 
46
 Id. at 163 (citing Reparaciones Colectivas en Abril, La Primera, Jan. 23, 2007, available at 
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(through bids) for funding, pitting those harmed against one another and creating “haves and 
have nots” among those who suffered.
47
  Partly in response to the outcry for individual economic 
reparations, in 2011, the Peruvian government finally announced its plan to pay individual 
reparations from a $7.1 million fund beginning in 2011.
48
  But the money allocated (roughly 
$100 per person) seemed to many to be too little, too late.
 49
 
This governmental dance around economic reconstruction and reparations has led critics 
to charge a failing commitment to reconciliation and a likely failure of the entire social healing 
initiative—on the one hand, unfocused development measures with limited or delayed benefit for 




 South Africa‟s reparations scheme has faced similar criticism.
51
  After 40 years of 
economic starvation under apartheid, in line with the capability approach, South Africa's Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) embraced a kind of economic justice “geared towards 
developing and empowering” black South Africans.
52
  The TRC thus combined forms of 
reparations to address individualized harms (from detention, torture and rape) as well as 
apartheid‟s widespread economic damage.  Its final report recommended, and the country 




Heated debate surrounded political and business reforms, particularly concerning 
affirmative action.  To promote restructuring, the new government enacted the Black Economic 
Empowerment Act.
54
  The Act imposed a new equity ownership requirement (to include black 
South Africans) for businesses contracting with the national government.
55
  Yet, white South 





 Angel Pez, Rights-Peru: No reparations for Families of Civil War Victims, INTERPRESS SERVICE, July 27, 2010, 




 As one redress expert observed, “development programs have a very low reparative capacity, for they do not 
target victims specifically, and what they normally try to achieve is to satisfy basic and urgent needs, which makes 
their beneficiaries perceive such programs, correctly, as ones that distribute goods to which they have rights as 
citizens, and not necessarily as victims.  In the second place, development programs are affected by a very high 
degree of uncertainty, for development aims are both complex and long-term.”  Pablo de Greiff, Justice and 
Reparations, in THE HANDBOOK OF REPARATIONS 451,470-71 (Pablo de Greiff, ed., 2006). 
51
 Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act No. 34 of 1995 (S. Afr.), synopsis (“. . . to provide for the 
establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission, comprising a Committee on Human Rights Violations, a 
Committee on Amnesty and a Committee on Reparation and Rehabilitation). 
52
 Eric K. Yamamoto and Susan K. Serrano, Assessment of Final Report of the South African Truth and 




 Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act 53 of 2003 (S. Afr.); Land Restitution and Reform Amendment 
Act 18 of 1999 (S. Afr.); Skills Development Act 97 of 1998 (S. Afr.); Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998 (S. Afr.); 
Higher Education Act 101 of 1997 (S. Afr.); Land Reform (Labour Tenants) Act 3 of 1996 (S. Afr.); Restitution of 
Land Rights Act 22 of 1994 (S. Afr.). 
55
 According to Waterhouse, supra note 26, at 289-90,  its aim, and partial effect, was to “provide new opportunities 
to large numbers of South Africans [to] enable them to take an active role in redressing the historic discrimination of 
the South African employment sector through their role in staffing and managing the nation's businesses.” “Under 
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Africa businesses and international contractors benefiting from apartheid retained all their past 
profits.  Some also worried that the legislation actually benefited only a small new wealthy black 
business elite—not those at society‟s middle and bottom.
56
 
The TRC had recommended holding businesses accountable for reparations because 
“business was central to the economy that sustained the South African state during the apartheid 
years.”
57
  Although there were varying degrees of business involvement, the Commission found 
that in general businesses benefited materially from apartheid policies.
58
  The Commission 
linked the widening gap between the rich and poor to the “historic benefit” enjoyed by apartheid 
businesses.
59
  The Commission thus recommended corporate restitution “to those who have 
suffered from the effects of apartheid discrimination.”
60
  The Commission also urged the 
“involvement of business in a wider project of reparation, relating not simply to those identified 
as victims by the Commission, but to all those South Africans whose normal development was 
impaired by the system of apartheid.”
61
  
With this latter concern in mind, South Africa's legislature passed the Employment 
Equity Act aimed to “bring the [long-excluded] masses of South African[s] slowly into a range 
of career jobs” by way of affirmative action.
62
  Some forward progress ensued—more black 
South Africans working in government and some businesses.  But advances were slow and for 
those at the bottom, largely non-existent.  Legislation supporters argued that the systemic 
damage was far-reaching and that real economic capacity-building under the new laws and 
government would take a generation or more.
63
  Others, looking from the bottom up, demanded 
immediate results. 
                                                                                                                                                             
the terms of this Act, companies doing business with the South African government or any organ of the state for 
procurement, licensing, or public-private partnerships, must diversify their equity ownership to include Blacks at 
levels set by the cabinet members that oversee the particular industries. . . .  Along with set targets, officials use a 
scorecard that examines the following indicators of economic involvement: direct empowerment through ownership 
and control of enterprises and assets; procurement from the aforementioned designated groups; the development of 
enterprises involving designated groups; and corporate investment that benefits members and communities from the 
designated groups and other workforce-related categories.” Id. at 290-91. 
56
 See Makau wa Mutua, Hope and Despair for a New South Africa: The Limits of Rights Discourse, 10 HARV. HUM. 
RTS. J. 63, 69 (1997) (“This Article argues that the rights framework adopted by the Mandela government protects 
existing social arrangements because it is traditional and conservative. Except for largely cosmetic effects, there is 
little possibility that the particular conceptualization of rights in the new South Africa will alter the patterns of 
power, wealth, and privilege established under apartheid.”). 
57
 Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report, Vol. 6, Sec. 2, Ch. 5, 140 (1999). 
58
 See id.  
59






 By doing so it sought “reversal of a century-long structural exclusion of these groups from gaining the training 
and skills required for these jobs, as well as the economic benefit of the higher salaries they provide.” Waterhouse, 
supra note 26, at 287. 
63
 The South African courts have, themselves, acknowledged the long duration that restoration will take.  Penelope 
E. Andrews, Reparations for Apartheid’s Victims: The Path to Reconciliation?, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1155, 1171-72 
(2004) (citing Final Report of the TRC, vol. 5, at ch. 9 (1999)).1171-2 (“Generations of children born and yet to be 
born will suffer the consequences of poverty, of malnutrition, of homelessness, of illiteracy and disempowerment 
generated and sustained by the institutions of apartheid and its manifest effects on life and living for so many.  The 
country has neither the resources nor the skills to reverse fully these massive wrongs.  It will take many years of 
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 Hence, the most intense controversy focused on individual monetary reparations.
64
  The 
South Africa Constitutional Court ruled that amnesty for perpetrators did not violate the 




 Given the government‟s financial priorities,
66
 however, the Mbeki administration resisted 
paying many individuals awarded Urgent Interim Reparations.  And it paid no Final Individual 
Reparations—to anyone.
 67
  The administration cited financial constraints and other worthy 
projects and suggested that “because the anti-apartheid struggle was about freedom, the victims' 
compensation claims are money-grubbing.”
68
  South Africa businesses and multinational 
corporations with a major presence in the country reacted with considered indifference.  More 
than ten years after the TRC‟s reparation recommendations, the private sectors' contribution to 
national reconciliation had been abysmal.  Not one South Africa corporation benefiting from 
apartheid had contributed to reparations for apartheid victims.
69
 
 For these reasons, despite promises of "repair", many who fought on the front lines 
against apartheid now find themselves destitute and forgotten.
70
  According to a former African 
National Congress soldier, 
[B]eing forgotten and overlooked is very painful. The government here has not 
followed through on its promise to look after the soldiers and activists who 
sacrificed their youth, their education and often their lives for the struggle. [The 
government and businesses] make promise after promise, but never deliver and I 




One consequence a perception of the impending demise of the fifteen-year nation-
building reconciliation project—even though it was immensely successful at fostering 
recognition and responsibility and served as the lynchpin for peaceful transition to democratic 
                                                                                                                                                             
strong commitment, sensitivity and labour to “reconstruct our society” so as to fulfill the legitimate dreams of new 
generations exposed to real opportunities for advancement denied to preceding generations.”) (citing AZAPO v 
President of South Africa 1996 (4) SA 671 (CC) at 43 (S. Afr.)). 
64
 Id. at 1164 (citing Final Report of the TRC, vol. 5, at ch. 9 (1999)). 
65
 AZAPO v President of South Africa 1996 (4) SA 671 (CC) at 43 (S. Afr.). 
66
 Concerning the limited availability of government funds in South Africa, see Erin Daly, Reparations in South 
Africa: A Cautionary Tale, 33 U. MEM. L. REV. 367, 376 (2003) (“In South Africa, as in most of the world's nations, 
the financial obligations of the new government are staggering, as medical care, housing, education, transportation, 
and other needs are of the utmost urgency for the vast majority of the population.”). 
67
 The TRC identified a closed list of 22,000 individual victims.  Of those, 17,000 were targeted for Urgent Interim 
Reparations.  They and others were promised larger final payments later.  Id. 
68
 Rosemary Nagy, Postapartheid Justice: Can Cosmopolitanism and Nation-Building Be Reconciled, 40 LAW & 
SOC‟Y REV. 623, 639-40 (2006). 
69
 Xolani Mbanjwa, R525m paid out since TRC started, THE PRETORIA NEWS, July 16, 2008, available at 
http://www.iol.co.za/index.php?set_id=1&click_id=13&art_id=vn20080716062642926C223345. 
70
 See Christopher J. Colvin, Overview of the Reparations Program in South Africa, in THE HANDBOOK OF 
REPARATIONS 176, 189 (Pablo de Greiff, ed., 2006) (“Almost all of the victims reported that many of those who did 
not receive UIR—because they were not considered urgent cases—„became jealous or mad‟, and reported increases 
in family and community conflicts.  Often those receiving UIR informed neither their neighbors nor even their 
immediate family members for fear of creating conflict or having the money simply taken away.”). 
71
 Daly, supra note 66, at 369 (quoting letter from M.M. to Erin Daly (2001)). 
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elections.  The TRC succeeded in generating a new global “truth” about the personal horrors of 
apartheid through cathartic victim storytelling.
72
  But, it appears, amnesty for apartheid criminal 
perpetrators, the government‟s failure to generate funds to implement its reparations mandate 
and the participatory recalcitrance of businesses profiting from white apartheid rule have thus far 
impeded the sense of “reconciliation achieved”.  Those harmed most by apartheid still struggle 
for daily survival while those who profited remain largely above the fray, untargeted and 
unapologetic.
73
   
Many now view South Africa‟s economic reforms as having generated economic 
advances but not economic justice—and therefore as falling well short of the goal of national 
unity through social healing.  To date, monetary reparations for apartheid victims have been 
woefully inadequate.  Most of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission‟s formal reparations 
recommendations await long-delayed implementation—whether for lack of government funding, 
corporate recalcitrance or other nations' deference to South Africa's sovereignty.  For William 
Gumede and others, especially with the effects of the recent global economic recession, there 
will be no reconciliation in South Africa—no social healing—without economic justice. 
Racial reconciliation is unlikely to take place unless it is accompanied by social 
justice. The fact that poverty still runs along racial lines, with blacks mostly poor, 
and whites mostly better off, is a real obstacle to reconciliation. Although former 
President Nelson Mandela initiated a far-reaching policy of reconciliation, and 
Mbeki in a more limited manner also, this has not been accompanied by economic 
reparations for those who still suffer most from the apartheid legacy of limited 
education, repossessing of land and property and broken families. The fact that 
economic inequality is run along racial lines, helps perpetuate racism. Some white 
South Africans appear ignorant of the continuing legacy of racial apartheid‟s 
exclusion of blacks from education, property and advancement. They can still 
argue that poor blacks are in their predicament mostly because they are somehow 




Facing this stark reality, new President Zuma dropped the former Mbeki administration's 
hard stance against reparations assistance from other countries.  Reversing course in 2010, Zuma 
now expressly supports a major economic reparations class action lawsuit filed by black South 
Africans in United States courts against the multinational corporations benefitting from 
                                                 
72
 See Eric K. Yamamoto, Race Apologies, 1 IOWA J. GENDER RACE AND JUSTICE 47 (1997) (discussing the public 
impact and cathartic effect of victim storytelling). 
73
 See id. at 205 (“The fight for reparations has also had the unfortunate consequence of sidelining the responsibility 
of other role players besides the government.  The complicity of foreign corporations and governments in supporting 
the apartheid regime has only recently entered the discussion.”); id. at 199 (“Jubilee South Africa has pointed out 
that the multinational corporations that helped to finance the apartheid government in its final, most repressive years 
removed roughly R3 billion (US$375,000,000) a year between 1985 and 1993 from the country.  Jubilee argues that 
if 1.5 percent of those profits was returned each year for six years, financial reparations at the level of the original 
TRC recommendations could be paid.”). 
74
 William Gumede, Social Justice Can Heal SA, DAILY DISPATCH, May 05, 2010, available at 
http://www.dispatch.co.za/article.aspx?id=399486. 




  The outcome of the lawsuit—and indeed South Africa's reconciliation initiative—is 
uncertain. 
 To conclude, on the one hand, individual reparations payments alone are almost always 
inadequate for healing the wounds of injustice.  On the other, broad economic initiatives alone 
can look much like social programs that a government should be undertaking anyway.
76
  
Capacity-building for those most harmed through individual payments and economic 
restructuring and development—economic justice—may well be a key to a personal and public 
sense of "reconciliation achieved".  In this light, one capability approach redress lesson from 
Peru and South Africa might be the indivisibility of individual reparations, institutional reforms 
and targeted economic development.  A second lesson might be the significance of replacing the 
mantra “first economic prosperity and only then attempts at social justice,” with the 
acknowledgment, even in financial hard times, of the salience of ground level economic justice 
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